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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model of asymmetric competition between a
pay TV and a free TV broadcaster. Our model shows that the pay TV broadcaster
has incentives to place advertising on its channel if the marginal return on advertis-
ing exceeds the viewers’ disutility from advertising. In this case, however, the pay
TV advertising level is always below the corresponding level on free TV. The pay
TV advertising level can increase with a higher viewer disutility from advertising
but the pay TV channel will never attract a larger viewership than the free TV
channel. Furthermore, we show that introducing advertising on pay TV induces a
decrease of the subscription fees on this channel and a decrease in the advertising
level of the free TV channel. Moreover, pay TV viewer demand can increase if the
pay TV broadcaster places advertising on its channel. If the viewer disutility of
advertising is sufficiently large, aggregate broadcaster profits increase through the
introduction of advertising in pay TV, while aggregate consumer surplus always
increases.
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1 Introduction
The television broadcasting industry is of crucial economic and social importance in the
US. Nearly every household owns a television set and the average American adult spends
more than five hours a day viewing television (TVB, 2011a). Television is also a very
important media for placing advertisements. In 2010, advertisers spent about $71 billion
(total advertising expenditures were $131 billion) to promote their products and services
on television (TVB, 2011b). There are two generic business models in the television
broadcasting industry: commercial free-to-air television and pay TV. Traditionally, the
television broadcasting industry has been dominated by free TV. In this business model,
viewers are fully subsidized because broadcasters want to attract as many viewers as
possible in order to maximize advertising revenues. Basically, a TV channel is more
attractive for advertisers, the larger its viewership. On the other hand, viewers typically
dislike advertising as it is perceived as a nuisance. This trade off suggests that there is
an optimal amount of advertising.
Due to technological progress (i.e. encryption techniques and digital decoding) pay
TV has emerged as a competing business model. Originally, pay TV broadcasters did not
air advertisements, but directly charged viewers for TV access. More recently, however,
some pay TV channels (in the US mostly cable subscription television networks such as
TNT, TBS, ESPN) started to air commercials in addition to charging subscription fees.
What are the economic effects of placing advertising on pay TV channels? How will
free TV broadcasters react? Will market shares of pay TV increase or decrease? Whose
profits will increase and whose will decrease? And, most importantly, will consumers
benefit or not?
To answer these and related questions, we develop a theoretical duopoly model of
asymmetric competition between a pay TV and a free TV broadcaster by utilizing the
Hotelling approach. We analyze the effects of placing pay TV advertising on broadcaster
market strategies (i.e., choice of subscription fee and advertising level), viewer demands,
broadcaster profits and consumer surplus. So far, the literature has concentrated on
the symmetric competition between either pay TV or free TV broadcasters. Because
the reality is often characterized by the coexistence of both pay TV and free TV, more
research that analyzes the competition between both business models is needed. Research
on symmetric competition neglects the important aspect of consumer migration from one
business model to the other. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature.
Our model shows that the pay TV broadcaster has incentives to place advertising on
its channel if the marginal return from advertising exceeds the viewers’ disutility from
advertising. In this case, however, the pay TV advertising level is always below the
corresponding level on free TV. Surprisingly, the pay TV advertising level can increase
with a higher viewer disutility from advertising but the pay TV channel will never attract
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a larger viewership than the free TV channel. Furthermore, we show that introducing
advertising in pay TV induces a decrease of the subscription fees on this channel and
a decrease in the advertising level of the free TV channel. Moreover, pay TV viewer
demand can increase if pay TV places advertising on its channel. Surprisingly, if the
viewer disutility of advertising is sufficiently large, aggregate broadcaster profits increase
through the introduction of advertising in pay TV, while on aggregate, consumers always
benefit from advertising on pay TV.
With increasing popularity and coverage, one can observe that various revenues models
are chosen by the pay TV broadcasters. Some pay TV channels choose to charge a higher
subscription fee, but air little or no advertising, while other pay TV channels combine
both viewer and advertiser incomes. This paper provides a conceptual framework for
how to choose and implement an optimal pay TV strategy when a free TV competitor
preexists in the market. It can also serve as a guide for pay TV broadcasters considering a
possible pay TV strategy change. Furthermore, our paper derives implications for policy
makers and regulatory authorities. For example, we find additional pay TV advertising
is not necessarily socially undesirable due to the strategic market reactions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the
related literature. In Section 3, we introduce the analytical framework. Section 4 presents
the equilibrium analysis of the model. In Section 5, we examine the effects of introducing
pay TV advertising on relevant equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 concludes and provides
implications for future research.
2 Related Literature
The literature on the economics of media markets is flourishing and has experienced a
significant growth in recent years.1 The focus of the extant literature is on the choice
of optimal market strategies by media platforms (i.e., content differentiation, advertising
level and viewer charge) and welfare implications in models with symmetric competition
between either free TV or pay TV. Some papers also consider two separate scenarios,
in which competition takes place between pay TV and free TV platforms, respectively,
and they compare the two independent scenarios. The key distinction of our paper from
previous research is that we explicitly model the direct competition between pay TV and
free TV, rather than treating them independently. Thus, our paper offers insights about
a scenario, in which pay TV and free TV exist at the same time and compete for the
same viewership. Although in reality pay TV and free TV often coexist, the literature
has neglected to model this aspect of asymmetric competition.
For example, in a model of symmetric competition, Anderson and Coate (2005) ana-
1See Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006), who provide a comprehensive overview to the literature.
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lyze the nature of market failure in the broadcasting industry. Commercial broadcasters
provide advertising levels and programming amount that can be above or below socially
optimal levels, depending on how strongly viewers dislike advertising. With the ability
to price programming, broadcasters can internalize the nuisance of advertisements by
substituting prices for advertising at the margin. However, this is not necessarily socially
desirable because pricing may also result in some viewers being inefficiently excluded.
In a similar context, Peitz and Valletti (2008) also introduce endogenous content
provision by competing TV broadcasters into their model.2 They assume that pay TV
broadcasters generate revenues from both advertisers and viewers, whereas free TV broad-
casters are solely funded by advertising. Their model shows that under free TV the
advertising level is higher than under pay TV when viewers strongly dislike advertising.
Under free TV, broadcasters tend to provide less differentiated content while they always
maximally differentiate their content under pay TV. However, they do not model asym-
metric competition because they consider two separate regimes with two competing pay
TV channels and two competing free TV channels, respectively.
Rather than horizontal program diversity, Armstrong (2005) studies the endogenous
choice of vertical program quality by competing broadcasters in a model of symmetric
competition. He also considers two separate funding regimes, in which either two pay TV
channels or two free TV channels compete against each other and finds that the program
quality level in the pay TV regime is higher than under the free TV regime. Our model
builds on Armstrong (2005), but we model asymmetric competition and focus on the
effects of introducing advertising on pay TV.
Moreover, Armstrong (2006) analyzes the competition between media firms in the
broader concept of a two-sided market.3 Inter alia, he analyzes a competitive bottleneck
in a two-sided media market, in which media platforms compete for viewers but not for
advertisers.4 If the consumers join only one specific media platform, advertisers have to
place advertising on all competing platforms to reach all consumers. The model shows
that the equilibrium price for the access to media platforms (i.e., magazines) depends on
how advertising charges are levied. The equilibrium reader price and platforms’ profit is
lower (higher) if platforms charge advertisers on a lump-sum basis than under a per-reader
basis in the case that readers like (dislike) advertising.
All papers mentioned above have considered models of duopoly competition in Hotelling
2For further work on the endogenous choice of content diversity between media platforms, see also
Gabszewicz et al. (2001), Gabszewicz et al. (2002), Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), and Gabszewicz et al.
(2004).
3Two-sided markets are markets in which the agents of two distinct market sides interact via a
platform and exert indirect network externalities upon each other. General research on two-sided markets
include Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Wright (2004), Armstrong (2006), Hagiu
(2006), Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009) and Weyl (2010).
4This assumption is also made in most other related models on media markets. An exception is
Reisinger (2011), who analyzed a two-sided market model in which media platforms compete for both
advertisers and users.
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fashion. Crampes et al. (2009) extend these analyses by considering the number of ac-
tive media platforms as endogenous. They develop a Salop-Vickrey style model of media
competition with free entry by assuming that media platforms are financed from adver-
tising receipts and consumer subscriptions or only from advertising receipts, in the case
of free media platforms.5 Their model suggests that there is an excessive level of entry
and an insufficient level of advertising under constant or increasing returns to scale in the
audience size. Similarly, Kind et al. (2009) allows the number of media platforms to vary
and investigates how media platforms raise revenue in a model with quadratic consumer
preferences. They find that media firms’ scope for raising advertising revenues is con-
strained by the number of media firms. Moreover, a low level of horizontal differentiation
between two media firms, or rather their content, restricts the scope for raising revenues
from direct consumer payment.
However, neither of these papers on media competition have analyzed the asymmetric
competition between pay TV and free TV. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper
that analyzes asymmetric competition is Lin (2011), who develops a duopoly model of
asymmetric competition between pay TV and free TV. His model focuses on the en-
dogenous choice of program quality made by television broadcasters. The paper shows
that the broadcasters vertically differentiate their channel programs if viewers strongly
or weakly dislike advertising. Depending on the degree of horizontal differentiation, pay
TV offers higher or lower quality programming than free TV. However, contrary to our
model, Lin (2011) excludes the possibility that pay TV can introduce advertising.
3 Analytical Framework
We consider a TV viewing market that is served by one pay TV broadcaster and one free
TV broadcaster. TV viewers, who are of mass one, are uniformly distributed along the
unit interval. The two competing channels are situated at the extremes of the interval
with the pay TV channel located at x = 0 and the free TV channel located at x = 1.
We consider the Hotelling model with linear transport cost of t > 0 per unit of length.
Hence, the two channel programs are horizontally differentiated from the perspective of
viewers and the parameter t can be interpreted as the differentiation parameter. A lower
value of t means that the channels or their program are perceived as closer substitutes
by the viewers.
The indirect utility of a viewer, located at point x ∈ [0, 1] when choosing the pay TV
5Choi (2006) has presented a related Salop-Vickrey model with free entry.
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channel denoted by p and the free TV channel denoted by f , respectively, is defined as
up = v − sp − γap − tx, (1)
uf = v − γaf − t(1− x), (2)
where v > 0 represents the viewers’ intrinsic value from watching TV. The pay TV
broadcaster charges viewers a subscription fee sp > 0 for the access to the channel pro-
gramming.6 We assume that both channels can place advertising, where the amount of
advertising placed on the pay TV and free TV channel is given by ap and af , respectively.
The parameter γ > 0 describes the extent to which viewers dislike advertising because
each advertisement produces a perceived nuisance cost of γ by the viewers.7 Moreover,
we make the assumption of full viewer market coverage, i.e., the viewers’ intrinsic value
from watching TV is sufficiently large such that all viewers will watch one program.
We further assume that viewers are single-homing, i.e., they choose only one channel
to watch. The marginal viewer, who is indifferent between watching pay TV and free TV,
can be identified at the location x = 1
2
[1 + 1
t
(γ(af − ap)− sp)]. All viewers to the left of
x, i.e., x ∈ [0, x), decide to watch pay TV programming and all viewers to the right of x,
i.e., x ∈ (x, 1], consume free TV programming. As a result, the viewer demand functions
for the pay TV and free TV channels, respectively, can be derived as
np =
1
2
[
1 +
1
t
(γ(af − ap)− sp)
]
, (3)
nf = 1− np = 1
2
[
1 +
1
t
(γ(ap − af ) + sp)
]
. (4)
We exclude the possibility of demand tipping at the viewer market which implies that
each broadcaster captures a positive market share.
We assume that placing advertising on its channel produces costs for each broadcaster
given by c(a) where c(a) ∈ C2 is a strictly convex cost function with c′(a) > 0 and
c′′(a) > 0 for a > 0 and c′(0) = c′′(0) = 0.8 These costs can be interpreted either
as transaction costs when broadcasters negotiate, serve, and deal with the advertisers,
or as direct costs for the operative/technical realization of advertising implementation.
6Note that we assume a positive subscription fee. Otherwise, the model would collapse to one with
symmetric competition between two free TV broadcasters.
7Kaiser and Song (2009) use data from the German magazine market to empirically assess the extent
to which readers (dis-)like advertising. They show that the readers’ attitude toward advertising depends
on the nature of advertisements. For example, readers in many magazine segments, such as women’s
magazines, business and politics magazines, and car magazines, in which advertisements are relatively
more informative, appreciate advertising. However, advertising is perceived as a nuisance to readers of
adult magazines, a segment, in which advertisements are particularly uninformative. Moreover, Rysman
(2004) found in the market for Yellow Pages that consumers value advertising.
8For the assumption that media firms incur costs for placing advertisements, see also Blair and
Romano (1993) and Armstrong (2006).
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Alternatively, these costs can be interpreted as broadcasters’ opportunity costs for given-
up programming slots/time. For simplicity, we assume that there are no other costs.
The profit functions of the broadcaster are then given by
pip = (sp + kap)np − c (ap) , (5)
pif = kafnf − c (af ) , (6)
where k > 0 is a parameter that captures how much revenue a broadcaster can generate
per ad a. The parameter k can be interpreted as a measure for the effectiveness of
advertising. For tractability, we assume a linear specification of advertising revenue, i.e.,
a broadcaster generates revenues of kan if its channel programming attracts n viewers
and a advertising are placed on the channel.
Moreover, the consumers (viewers) of the pay TV and free TV channel derive the
following surpluses:
CSp =
∫ np
0
(v − sp − γap − tz) dz = (v − sp − γap)np − t
2
n2p, (7)
CSf =
∫ 1
np
(v − γaf − t(1− z)) dz = (1− np)
(
v − γaf − t
2
(1− np)
)
. (8)
Aggregate consumer (viewer) surplus is then given by the sum of pay TV and free TV
consumer surpluses, i.e., CS = CSp + CSf .
4 Analysis
The pay TV broadcaster has two strategic variables at its disposal: the subscription fee
sp and the level of advertising ap. For the free TV broadcaster, the level of advertising af
is the only choice variable. Therefore, the broadcasters solve the following maximization
problems:
max
(sp,ap)≥0
{pip = [sp + kap]np(sp, ap)− c (ap)} , (9)
max
af>0
{pif = kafnf (af )− c (af )} . (10)
The first-order conditions for the pay TV broadcaster are given by
∂pip
∂sp
= n∗p(s
∗
p, a
∗
p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (s∗p + ka
∗
p)
∂n∗p
∂sp︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
= 0, (11)
∂pip
∂ap
= kn∗p(s
∗
p, a
∗
p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (s∗p + ka
∗
p)
∂n∗p
∂ap︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− c′ (a∗p) = 0, (12)
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where c′(a) ≡ ∂c(a)
∂a
. To ensure that the second-order conditions for a maximum are
satisfied, the differentiation parameter t has to be sufficiently large, i.e.,9
t > tSOC ≡ (k − γ)
2
4c′′
(
a∗p
) ,
where c′′ (a) ≡ ∂2c(a)
∂a2
. From the first-order conditions (11) and (12), we observe that
increasing either the subscription fee or the advertising level triggers a positive revenue
effect and a negative demand effect because pay TV viewer demand decreases with sp
and ap, respectively. Additionally, increasing the advertising level induces higher costs
(cost effect).
For the free TV broadcaster, the first-order condition is given by10
∂pif
∂af
= kn∗f (a
∗
f ) + ka
∗
f
∂n∗f
∂af
− c′(a∗f ) = 0. (13)
and has a similar interpretation as above. By solving this system of equations, we can
establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (i) For the pay TV channel, the subscription fee s∗p and advertising level a
∗
p
in equilibrium are implicitly given by
s∗p =
1
2
(γa∗f − (k + γ)a∗p + t) and c′(a∗p) =
k − γ
4t
(γa∗f + (k − γ)a∗p + t), (14)
and for the free TV channel the equilibrium advertising level a∗f is implicitly given by
c′(a∗f ) =
k
4t
(−3γa∗f − (k − γ)a∗p + 3t). (15)
(ii) The equilibrium (s∗p, a
∗
p, a
∗
f ) exists and is unique if the differentiation parameter t
is sufficiently large with t > teq.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Regarding part (i), we assume that t > ts ≡ ka∗p + γ(a∗p − a∗f ) to ensure the pay
TV broadcaster sets a positive subscription fee. Hence, if the channel programs are not
sufficiently differentiated, the viewers are not willing to pay an additional subscription
fee for watching pay TV containing advertising because they can enjoy similar programs
on free TV. As a result our model would collapse to one with symmetric competition
between two free TV broadcasters. Moreover, to ensure the free TV sets a positive
advertising level, the differentiation parameter t has to be sufficiently large, with t >
taf ≡ γa∗f + k−γ3 a∗p.
9For a derivation of the second-order conditions, see the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A.1.
10The second-order condition is satisfied because ∂
2pif
∂a2f
= −kγt −
∂2c(a∗f )
∂a2f
< 0.
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According to part (ii), a necessary assumption to ensure the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium is also a sufficiently large differentiation parameter with t > teq. This
assumption guarantees that the advertising level, which pay TV would have to set such
that the free TV broadcaster has no incentives to place advertising on its channel (i.e.,
free TV is driven out of the market) is larger than the pay TV advertising level if free
TV refrains from advertising. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, we need this technical
property to show that the reaction functions have at least one intersection point, which
ensures the existence of an equilibrium. The uniqueness then follows from the strictly
monotonous reaction functions. In the case of a quadratic cost function c(a) = 1/2a2,
the threshold is given by teq =
(k−γ)2
3
> (k−γ)
2
4
= tSOC . Hence, a fulfillment of the second-
order condition for pay TV implies the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
However, this is not necessarily true for a general cost function c(a) because the threshold
teq, which is only given implicitely, depends on c
′′(a). Therefore, in the subsequent
analysis, we assume that the differentiation parameter is sufficiently large with t > t∗ ≡
max{tSOC , teq, ts, taf}.
With the subscription fee s∗p, the equilibrium demands of the viewers for the pay TV
and free TV channels, respectively, are given by
n∗p =
1
2
[
1 +
1
2t
(γ(a∗f − a∗p) + ka∗p − t)
]
, (16)
n∗f =
1
2
[
1 +
1
2t
(γ(a∗p − a∗f )− ka∗p + t)
]
. (17)
Note that t > t∗ also ensures that n∗p and n
∗
f are both positive.
In a further step, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) For γ = k, the pay TV broadcaster will not place advertising on its
channel, while for γ ∈ [0, k), the pay TV broadcaster places advertising on its channel
and its level of advertising is always below the corresponding level on the free TV channel.
(ii) The level of advertising a∗f on the free TV channel always decreases with a higher
viewer disutility γ from advertising. For the pay TV channel, the level of advertising a∗p
increases with a higher viewer disutility if this disutility is sufficiently small. Formally,
∂a∗f
∂γ
< 0 and
∂a∗p
∂γ
> 0⇔ γ < γ̂ ≡ k(a
∗
f−2a∗p)−t
2(a∗f−a∗p)
.
(iii) The pay TV channel never attracts a larger viewership than the free TV channel
independent of the viewer disutility from advertising, i.e., n∗f ≥ n∗p.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Part (i) of the proposition indicates that a pay TV broadcaster has incentives to
place advertising on its channel in addition to a positive subscription fee, if the marginal
return on advertising exceeds the viewers’ disutility from advertising, i.e., k > γ. In other
words, for a given level of k, placing advertising is beneficial for the pay TV broadcaster’s
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profits whenever the viewers’ disutility from advertising is not too strong. Otherwise,
i.e., if γ = k, the pay TV broadcaster is better off in terms of profits when relying only
on subscription fees.11 It implies that there is no scope for pay TV to place advertising
when the viewers’ disutility from advertising is too strong (γ = k). Otherwise, viewers
will simply migrate away from pay TV where they originally intend to avoid annoying
advertising by paying a subscription fee. If the viewers’ disutility from advertising is
below the marginal return on advertising, then the pay TV broadcaster is able to choose
an optimal income mix from both subscription and advertising revenues. However, in
this case, the pay TV channel will always set a lower advertising level than the free TV
channel.
Our result for the case γ < k also rejects the claim of so-called ”profit neutrality.” It
has been often demonstrated that there is a full pass-through of advertising revenues into
lower subscription fees.12 It implies that advertising revenues do not affect the profits
of two media platforms in equilibrium; however, this finding is only valid for the case
of symmetric competition between two pay TV channels both using advertising. We
have shown, under certain circumstances, profit neutrality does not apply to the pay TV
broadcaster under asymmetric competition with a free TV channel because advertising
revenues are not neutral, but rather increase overall profit.
Regarding the comparative statics results in part (ii), we derive that the advertising
level a∗f of the free TV channel always decreases with a higher viewer disutility from
advertising γ. To observe the intuition behind this result, we rearrange the first-order
condition (13) of the free TV broadcaster and write
c′(a∗f ) = kn
∗
f + ka
∗
f
∂n∗f
∂af
. (18)
Recall that a higher free TV advertising level triggers a positive effect kn∗f through higher
advertising revenues and a negative effect ka∗f
∂n∗f
∂af
through a lower viewer demand on
profits. We derive that a higher γ diminishes the positive effect and strengthens the
negative effect, which lowers the right-hand side (rhs) of (18).13 As a result, the free TV
broadcaster lowers its advertising level a∗f to ensure a decrease of the left-hand side (lhs).
Regarding the behavior of the pay TV broadcaster with respect to a higher disutility
parameter γ, we rearrange its first-order condition (12) and write
c′
(
a∗p
)
= kn∗p + (s
∗
p + ka
∗
p)
∂n∗p
∂ap
. (19)
11The case γ > k is not feasible as shown in Appendix A.2.
12See, for example, Peitz and Valletti (2008).
13Formally, with τ1 ≡ knf and τ2 ≡ kaf ∂nf∂af , we derive ∂τ1∂γ = k4t (ap− af ) < 0 and ∂τ2∂γ = −kaf 14t < 0.
Hence, the positive effect is diminished and the strength of the negative effect increases.
10
Similarly to above, a higher free TV advertising level triggers a positive effect kn∗p through
higher advertising revenues and a negative effect (s∗p+ka
∗
p)
∂n∗p
∂ap
through a lower viewer de-
mand on profits. Contrary to above, a higher viewer disutility from advertising strenghens
both the positive and the negative effect. Hence, the effect of a higher γ on the rhs of
(19) is ambiguous and depends on the level of γ. First, suppose that the threshold γ̂
is positive, which implies that the differentiation parameter t is sufficiently small, i.e.,
t < t̂ ≡ k(a∗f − 2a∗p). If γ is sufficiently small with γ < γ̂, then the rhs increases with a
higher viewer disutility from advertising such that the pay TV broadcaster increases ap to
ensure an increase of the lhs. If γ > γ̂, the reverse is true and the advertising level in pay
TV decreases with a higher γ. However, if the differentiation parameter t is sufficiently
large, i.e., t > t̂, then the threshold γ̂ is negative, and hence, a higher viewer disutility
from advertising induces a decrease in the advertising level in pay TV independent of γ.
Part (iii) of the proposition indicates that the free TV channel never attracts a lower
viewership than the pay TV channel even though viewers might derive a comparatively
large disutility from advertising and the advertising level in free TV is always higher
than in pay TV. To observe the intuition behind this result, consider the case where
viewers do not perceive advertisement as a nuisance, i.e., γ = 0. In this case, it is
not surprising that the free TV channel attracts more viewers than the pay TV channel
because viewers are charged via the subscription fee for pay TV. Increasing the disutility
parameter γ has the following effects on pay TV viewer demand. Total differentiation of
n∗p =
1
2
[1 + 1
t
(γ(a∗f − a∗p)− s∗p)] yields
dn∗p
dγ
=
1
2t
[(a∗f − a∗p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ γ
∂(a∗f − a∗p)
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
R0
− ∂s
∗
p
∂γ︸︷︷︸
>0
].
Given that the free TV channel has a higher level of advertising than the pay TV channel,
a higher γ pronounces this difference and therefore has a direct positive effect a∗f − a∗p
on viewer demand. However, it is ambiguous whether the difference in advertising levels
a∗f−a∗p shrinks or expends such that the sign of the second effect is undetermined. Finally,
a higher γ induces an increase in the subscription fee s∗p, which has a negative effect on
pay TV viewer demand. Overall, it is ambiguous whether pay TV viewer demand follows
a U-shaped or an inverted U-shaped pattern in the disutility parameter γ. However, we
know if the differentiation parameter t is sufficiently small, i.e., t < t̂,14 then pay TV
and free TV viewer demand follows an inverted U-shaped and U-shaped pattern in γ,
respectively, because a higher viewer disutility from advertising induces a decrease in the
pay TV advertising level. Formally, ∂n∗p/∂γ
∣∣
γ=0
= [(a∗f − a∗p) + k(∂a∗p/∂γ)]/(4t) > 0 if
∂a∗p/∂γ > 0. Finally, we derive that the pay TV channel attracts the same viewership as
14Note that t < t̂ implies γ̂ > 0.
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the free TV channel if the disutility parameter γ is given by γ =
t−ka∗p
a∗f−a∗p
.
By substituting (n∗p, n
∗
f , s
∗
p) into the profit functions (5) and (6), we derive the equi-
librium profits of the pay TV and free TV broadcaster, respectively, as
pi∗p =
1
8t
(γa∗f + (k − γ)a∗p + t)2 − c(a∗p),
pi∗f =
ka∗f
4t
(−γa∗f − (k − γ)a∗p + 3t)− c(a∗f ).
5 The Effects of Placing Advertisements in Pay TV
In this section, we investigate the effects of marginally increasing the pay TV advertising
level on the equilibrium outcomes. With this approach, we can deduce the consequences
if a pay TV broadcaster switches from a strategy that solely relies on subscription fees
to a strategy where, in addition to subscription fees, the pay TV broadcaster places
advertising on its channel.15 To ensure that the pay TV broadcaster has incentives to
place advertising on its channel, we assume that γ < k.
First, we analyze the effects of introducing pay TV advertising on the free TV adver-
tising level, the pay TV subscription fee and viewer demands. We establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Introducing advertising on the pay TV channel has the following effects:
(i) The subscription fee on the pay TV channel decreases and the free TV channel
reduces its advertising level.
(ii) Viewer demand for pay TV decreases and viewer demand for free TV increases if
the viewers’ disutility from advertising is sufficiently large with γ > γn ≡ k1−da∗f/dap . The
reverse holds true for γ < γn.
Proof. Below in the text.
Part (i). The subscription fee on the pay TV channel decreases if the pay TV broad-
caster decides to place advertising on its channel. To prove this finding, we compute the
total derivative of s∗p with respect to ap as
ds∗p
dap
=
∂s∗p
∂ap
+
∂s∗p
∂af
da∗f
dap
=
1
2
[
−(γ + k) + γ da
∗
f
dap
]
< 0.
Both the direct effect, as well as, the indirect effect of a higher ap are negative, yielding a
lower subscription fee. To compensate the viewers for watching advertising, the pay TV
broadcaster lowers its subscription fee. In more common terms of the two-sided market
15Formally, the effect of introducing advertising on pay TV is given by ∂∂ap
∣∣∣
ap=0
.
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literature, additional advertising revenues will be passed through to the viewers in the
form of a lower subscription fee.16
To prove the claim that the free TV channel always reduces its own advertising level
when the pay TV channel places advertising, we rearrange the optimality condition (15)
of the free TV channel and we derive17
da∗f
dap
= − k(k − γ)
3kγ + 4tc′′(a∗f )
< 0.
Intuitively, one might think that when a pay TV channel introduces advertising, the free
TV channel faces less fierce competition and hence, tends to increase its own advertising
level. However, as we have shown, there is also an accompanying effect from pay TV,
lowering its subscription fee. The latter effect dominates, and hence, the free TV channel
reduces its own advertising level.
Part (ii) shows that the demand effect of introducing advertising in pay TV depends
on the level of viewers’ disutility from advertising. If the disutility is sufficiently small
(i.e., γ < γn) then viewer demand decreases for free TV and increases for pay TV. If the
disutility is sufficiently large (i.e., γ > γn) then the opposite holds true. Formally, the
effect of a higher pay TV advertising level on the pay TV viewer demand (16) is given by
dn∗p
dap
=
∂n∗p
∂ap
+
∂n∗p
∂af
da∗f
dap
=
1
4t
[
k + γ
(
da∗f
dap
− 1
)]
R 0.
On one hand, a higher advertising level a∗p has a positive (direct) effect on the viewer
demand n∗p because the lower subscription fee overcompensates for a higher advertising
level. On the other hand, the indirect effect via a lower advertising level a∗f on the free
TV channel is negative. The overall effect on n∗p depends on the extent γ to which viewers
dislike advertising, i.e.,
dn∗p
dap
< 0⇔ γ > γn ≡ k
1− da∗f/dap
,
with γn < k because da
∗
f/dap < 0. Hence, if the viewers’ disutility of advertising is
sufficiently small, i.e. γ < γn, introducing advertising on the pay TV channel induces
a higher demand on this channel but a lower demand on the free TV channel because
n∗f = 1 − n∗p. If, however, the viewers’ disutility of advertising is sufficiently large, i.e.
γ > γn, then introducing advertising on the pay TV channel induces a lower demand on
this channel but a higher demand on the free TV channel. The intuition is as follows:
when viewers strongly dislike advertising, they will value a reduction in the level of
16Using data from the German magazine market, Kaiser and Wright (2006) find results which are
consistent with this result. That is, advertisers value readers more than readers value advertisements,
and thus, magazines subsidize cover prices and make their profits from advertisers.
17See part (ii) in the proof of Lemma 1.
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advertising on free TV more than a decrease in the subscription fee for pay TV. As a
result, free TV becomes relatively more attractive for the viewers and more viewers will
choose free TV over pay TV.
In the next proposition, we analyze the effects of placing pay TV advertising on
broadcaster profits and consumer surplus.
Proposition 3 Introducing advertising on the pay TV channel has the following effects:
(i) Aggregate broadcaster profits increase if the viewers’ disutility from advertising is
sufficiently large with γ > γΠ.
(ii) Consumer surplus of pay TV viewers increases if the viewers’ disutility from
advertising is sufficiently large with γ > γCSp, while the viewers’ disutility from advertising
must be sufficiently small with γ < γCSf to ensure an increase in consumer surplus of free
TV viewers. However, aggregate consumer (viewer) surplus always increases independent
of the viewers’ disutility from advertising.
Proof. Below in the text.
Regarding the effects on pay TV broadcaster profits in part (i), we know that the
profit-maximizing advertising level for the pay TV channel is positive, i.e., a∗p > 0 if the
viewers’ disutility from advertising is smaller than the marginal return of advertising,
i.e., γ < k. Hence, it is clear that profits of the pay TV channel must increase when
switching from a strategy that solely relies on subscription fees to a strategy consisting of
both subscription and advertising income, i.e., pi∗p(s
∗
p, 0) < pi
∗
p(s
∗
p, a
∗
p). Otherwise, the pay
TV channel would opt not to place any advertising and choose a∗p = 0. Hence, for γ < k,
additional advertising revenues will overcompensate the loss in subscription revenues and
additional costs. Formally, we derive
dpi∗p
dap
= (
ds∗p
dap︸︷︷︸
<0
+ k)n∗p + (s
∗
p + ka
∗
p)
dn∗p
dap︸︷︷︸
R0
− dc
dap︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0.
However, two questions remain whether and under which conditions the free TV
broadcaster can benefit from the pay TV’s strategy change. The effect of introducing
pay TV advertising on the free TV broadcaster profit is given by
dpi∗f
dap
= k
da∗f
dap︸︷︷︸n∗f
<0
+ ka∗f
dn∗f
dap︸︷︷︸
>0⇔γ>γn
− ∂c
∂af
da∗f
dap︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
We know that the introduction of pay TV advertising leads to a reduction of the ad-
vertising level on the free TV channel. This reduction triggers a negative effect through
lower advertising revenues and a positive effect through lower advertising costs. More-
over, the reduction of the advertising level on the free TV channel affects viewer demand.
14
The demand effect can be positive or negative dependent on the viewers’ disutility from
advertising. We find that even in the case of a negative demand effect, i.e., γ < γn, the
profit of the free TV channel may increase through the introduction of advertising on the
pay TV because
dpi∗f
dap
> 0⇔ γ > γpif ≡
k + 4t
ka∗f
( ∂c
∂af
da∗f
dap
)
1− da∗f/dap
.
We derive γpif < γn because
4t
ka∗f
( ∂c
∂af
da∗f
dap
) < 0. Hence, for γ ∈ (γpif , γn) the negative effect
on profits through lower advertising revenues and lower viewership are overcompensated
for by lower advertising costs. Due to the profit-increasing cost effect, the critical thresh-
old γpif above which profits of the free TV channel increases through the introduction of
advertising on the pay TV is smaller than the threshold for increasing viewer demand γn.
However, when γ is sufficiently small (γ < γpif ), the positive cost effect cannot catch up
the negative revenue effect caused by a lower advertising level and a shrinking viewership
such that the overall free TV broadcaster’s profit decreases after pay TV implements
advertising.
Regarding aggregate broadcaster profits Π∗ = pi∗p + pi
∗
f , we derive
dΠ∗
dap
=
dpi∗p
dap︸︷︷︸
>0
+
dpi∗f
dap︸︷︷︸
>0⇔γ>γpif
.
Given that the profit of the pay TV channel increases if this channel introduces ad-
vertising, it is clear that aggregate profits increase whenever the profit of the free TV
channel increases, i.e., γ > γpif . However, due to the positive impact of pay TV profits,
it suffices that γ > γΠ with γΠ < γpif to ensure an increase in aggregate profits, i.e.,
dΠ∗
da∗p
> 0⇔ γ > γΠ.
Regarding part (ii), we derive that an introduction of advertising in pay TV has the
following effect on the pay TV consumer surplus:
dCS∗p
dap
= (−ds
∗
p
dap
− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
n∗p + u
∗
p
dn∗p
dap︸︷︷︸,
>0⇔γ<γn
where u∗p = v − s∗p − γa∗p − tn∗p > 0. Although the advertising level ap increases, pay
TV consumers benefit from a higher advertising level because the subscription fee s∗p
decreases stronger than their disutility from advertising γ increases, i.e.,
∣∣∣ ds∗pdap ∣∣∣ > γ.18 If,
in addition, a higher pay TV advertising level induces more viewer demand for pay TV,
which is the case for γ < γn, then the effect of a higher ap on pay TV consumer surplus
18Note that
∣∣∣ ds∗pdap ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ 12 (−(γ + k) + γ da∗fdap )∣∣∣ = 12 (γ+k)+ γ2 ∣∣∣da∗fdap ∣∣∣ > γ ⇔ k2 + γ2 ∣∣∣∂a∗f∂ap ∣∣∣ > γ2 because k > γ.
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is clearly positive. However, a higher pay TV advertising level triggers a negative effect
on the consumer surplus through a lower viewer demand for pay TV if γ > γn. We can
conclude that γ < γCSp with γn < γCSp suffices to ensure an increase in pay TV consumer
surplus, i.e.,
dCS∗p
dap
> 0⇔ γ < γCSp .
Similarly, for the free TV consumer surplus, we derive
dCS∗f
dap
= γ
(
n∗p − 1
) ∂a∗f
∂ap︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− u∗f
dn∗p
dap︸︷︷︸,
<0⇔γ>γn
where u∗f = v − γa∗f − t
(
1− n∗p
)
> 0. Pay TV advertising exerts a positive effect on
the free TV viewer surplus through a lower free TV advertising level. If, in addition,
free TV viewer demand increases, i.e., γ > γn, then the overall effect of introducing pay
TV advertising on the free TV viewer surplus is positive. However, even if the free TV
viewer demand decreases through a higher pay TV advertising level, i.e., γ < γn, the
lower free TV advertising level can overcompensate for the lower viewer demand. Hence,
dCS∗f
dap
> 0⇔ γ > γCSf , where γn > γCSf .
In aggregate, we derive
dCS∗
dap
= (−ds
∗
p
dap
− γ)n∗p + γ
(
n∗p − 1
) da∗f
dap
+ (u∗p − u∗f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dn∗p
dap
> 0.
Introducing pay TV advertising has an unambiguously positive effect on the overall con-
sumer surplus of both channels. Additional benefit derived by the viewers from a lower
subscription fee and a lower free TV advertising level exceeds the disutility from addi-
tional pay TV advertising. Because of the Hotelling model specification, the demand
effects are neutral.
Finally, we derive the welfare implications of introducing advertising in pay TV. We
assume that social welfare is given as an unweighted sum of aggregate profits and con-
sumer surplus19
W = (pip + pif ) + (CSp + CSf ).
We find that social welfare increases with the introduction of advertising in pay TV if the
viewers’ disutility from advertising is sufficiently large, i.e., dW
∗
dap
> 0 ⇔ γ > γW , where
γW < γΠ. Given that aggregate consumer surplus always increases, it is clear that social
welfare increases if aggregate profits increase, which is the case if γ > γΠ. However,
a possible decrease in profits can be overcompensated for by an increase in consumer
surplus such that γW < γΠ.
19Because our model does not explicitly model the advertising market, our welfare function does not
capture the advertisers’ surplus.
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6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of asymmetric competition between a pay TV broadcaster
and a free TV broadcaster to analyze the effects of introducing advertising in pay TV.
Our model shows that the pay TV broadcaster will place advertising on its channel if
the viewers’ disutility of watching advertising is not too strong. Introducing advertising
on the pay TV channel leads to a lower subscription fee because additional advertising
revenues will be passed through to the viewers. Moreover, as a strategic reaction, the
free TV channel reduces its own advertising level. The corresponding viewer demand
effects are ambiguous. If the viewers derive a sufficiently low disutility from advertising,
then placing advertising in pay TV induces a higher demand on this channel but a
lower demand on the free TV channel. In this case, the viewers value a decrease of the
subscription fee in pay TV more than a reduction of the advertising level in free TV.
Because the demand effects are neutral in our Hotelling model, the overall consumer
surplus on both channels increases through the introduction of pay TV advertising. Con-
sumers of pay TV benefit from the introduction of advertising on their channel if their
disutility derived from watching advertising is sufficiently low, while the reverse holds
true for the consumers of free TV. On aggregate, the consumers benefit more from a
lower subscription fee and a lower free TV advertising level than they suffer from ad-
ditional pay TV advertising. Moreover, if the marginal return from advertising exceeds
the viewers’ disutility from advertising then introducing advertising in pay TV increases
profits of this channel. Regarding the free TV profits, we find that placing advertising in
pay TV has a positive effect on the free TV broadcaster’s profit if the viewers’ disutility
from advertising is sufficiently strong. In this case, the positive viewer demand and cost
effect overcompensate for the negative revenue effect through a lower advertising level.
Because the model in this paper is a stylized one, we have made some simplifying
assumptions. For example, viewers are supposed to join either pay TV or free TV. It is
reasonable that free TV viewers without paying the subscription fee are excluded from the
pay TV programming such that they are “forced” to single-home. By contrast, pay TV
viewers still have the opportunity to watch free TV programming and thus they have the
possibility to multi-home.20 However, the single-homing assumption of viewers is widely
adopted in the existing literature when it comes to capture the competition for viewer
market share between media firms.21 One can justify the assumption by pointing out
that viewers cannot physically watch two broadcasts at the same time (at least without
decreasing the entertainment value) and thus have to make a choice for watching only
20Note that pay TV packages can also include free TV channels.
21Rasch (2007) introduced a model of the so-called partial multi-homing behavior of agents in two-
sided markets, assuming that some agents single-home, while the rest multi-homes. Anderson et al.
(2010) explore how equilibrium prices behave if media consumers single-purchase (i.e., they buy either
Time or Newsweek) or if some consumers multi-purchase (i.e., they buy both).
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one channel. Furthermore, we have assumed that the broadcaster’s marginal return on
advertising and the viewers’ disutility parameter is symmetric between channels.
An interesting avenue for further research would be to allow for heterogeneity in the
effectiveness of advertising and the disutility parameter, respectively. Moreover, it would
be interesting to extend our framework and to explicitly model the advertiser’s market.
This extension would allow deriving social welfare that includes the advertiser’s surplus.
In our model, social welfare comprises only aggregate broadcasting profit and viewer
surplus. Finally, further research regarding the viewers’ disutility from advertising is
needed.22 For example, it would be potentially fruitful to empirically assess the value of
the disutility parameter.
22As also suggested by Peitz and Valletti (2008).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we derive the second-order conditions. By noting that ∂np
∂sp
= − 1
2t
, ∂
2np
∂s2p
= 0,
∂np
∂ap
= − γ
2t
, ∂
2np
∂a2p
= 0, ∂c
∂ap
> 0 and ∂
2c
∂a2p
> 0, the second-order conditions for a maximum
require
(a)
∂2pip
∂(sp)2
= −1
t
< 0 and
∂2pip
∂a2p
= −kγ
t
− ∂
2c
∂a2p
< 0,
(b)
∂2pip
∂s2p
∂2pip
∂a2p
− ∂
2pip
∂sp∂ap
∂2pip
∂ap∂sp
=
1
t
(
kγ
t
+
∂2c
∂a2p
)
−
(
−k + γ
2t
)2
> 0.
It is easy to see that (a) is satisfied by definition. To ensure that (b) is satisfied, we must
assume that t > (k−γ)
2
4c′′(a∗p)
, where c′′(ap) = ∂
2c
∂a2p
.
Second, we derive the optimality conditions in part (i). By solving ∂pip
∂sp
= 0 for
sp with
∂np
∂sp
= − 1
2t
, we obtain s∗p =
1
2
(γa∗f − (k + γ)a∗p + t). Plugging s∗p into ∂pip∂ap =
kn∗p(s
∗
p, a
∗
p) + (s
∗
p + ka
∗
p)
∂n∗p
∂ap
− c′ (a∗p) = 0 and ∂pif∂af = kn∗f (a∗f ) + ka∗f ∂n∗f∂af − c′(a∗f ) = 0 and
rearranging these equations produces the optimality conditions for pay TV and free TV.
Part (ii). To prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (s∗p, a
∗
p, a
∗
f ), we
proceed as follows. First, we show that the reaction function Rf (ap) of free TV is a
monotonous decreasing function in ap and the reaction function Rp(af ) of pay TV is a
monotonous increasing function in af . We rearrange the optimality conditions of pay TV
and free TV and we define
Fp(a
∗
p, a
∗
f ) =
k − γ
4t
(γa∗f + (k − γ)a∗p + t)− c′(a∗p),
Ff (a
∗
p, a
∗
f ) =
k
4t
(−3γa∗f − (k − γ)a∗p + 3t)− c′(a∗f ).
With the implicit function theorem, we derive
da∗p
daf
= −∂Fp/∂af
∂Fp/∂ap
= − γ(k − γ)
(k − γ)2 − 4tc′′(a∗p)
t>tSOC
> 0,
da∗f
dap
= −∂Ff/∂ap
∂Ff/∂af
= − k(k − γ)
3kγ + 4tc′′(a∗f )
< 0.
Hence, pay TV reacts with a higher advertising level to an increase in the free TV
advertising level, while the opposite holds true for the reaction of free TV. We illustrate
the reaction functions in Figure 1.
We define ap as the advertising level, which pay TV would have to set such that the free
TV broadcaster has no incentives to places advertising on its channel, i.e., Rf (ap) = 0.
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Figure 1: Reaction Functions
af
apap ap
* ap
af*
Rf(ap)
Rp(af)
Moreover, ap is the pay TV advertising level if free TV refrains from advertising, i.e.,
ap = Rp(0). Now, we have to show that ap > ap. This guarantees that the monotonous
reaction function have exactly one intersection point, which characterizes the unique
equilibrium.
Because c′(a∗f ) =
k
4t
(−3γa∗f−(k−γ)a∗p+3t) is the optimality condition for free TV, we
derive that if ap =
3t
k−γ then af = 0. Hence, ap(t) =
3t
k−γ and thus
∂ap
∂t
> 0. Moreover, ap is
implicitely characterized by the pay TV’s optimality condition c′(ap) =
k−γ
4t
((k−γ)ap+t).
With the implicit function theorem, we derive
∂ap
∂t
=
ap(k − γ)2
t
[
(k − γ)2 − 4tc′′(ap)
] < 0,
for t sufficiently large. Because ap(t) is continuous and a monotonously increasing function
in t and ap(t) is continuous and a monotonously decreasing function in t, there exists
a value teq such that ap(t) > ap(t) for all t > teq. Hence, we have shown that for
a sufficiently large differentiation parameter teq, an unique equilibrium (a
∗
p, a
∗
f ) exists.
Hence, the equilibrium subscription fee s∗p also exists and is unique.
For example, for a quadratic cost function c(a) = 1/2a2, the advertising level ap(t) is
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given by
ap(t) =
t(k − γ)
4t− (k − γ)2 ,
and thus
ap(t) > ap(t)⇔ t > teq ≡
(k − γ)2
3
.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove part (i), we differentiate three cases:
1. Suppose that γ = k. In this case, we derive c′(a∗p) = 0 and hence a
∗
p = 0. The
subscription fee is then given by s∗p =
1
2
(ka∗f + t) and a
∗
f is implicitly defined by
c′(a∗f ) =
3k
4t
(−ka∗f + t). To ensure that the free TV broadcaster sets a positive
advertising level, it must hold t > ka∗f and hence a
∗
f > a
∗
p for γ = k.
2. Suppose that γ = 0. In this case, the subscription fee is given by s∗p =
1
2
(−ka∗p + t).
To ensure a positive fee, we assume that t > ka∗p. The advertising level (a
∗
p, a
∗
f )
are then implicitly defined by c′(a∗p) =
k
4t
(ka∗p + t) and c
′(a∗f ) =
k
4t
(−ka∗p + 3t).
Since t > ka∗p, the free TV broadcaster sets a positive advertising level because
−ka∗p + 3t > 0. Next, we derive
c′(a∗p)− c′(a∗f ) =
k(ka∗p − t)
2t
< 0,
because t > ka∗p. It follows that a
∗
f > a
∗
p for γ = 0.
3. Suppose that γ ∈ (0, k). We can show that a∗p and a∗f will never coincide in the
interval γ ∈ (0, k). Suppose that a∗p = a∗f = a∗ and hence c(a∗p) = c(a∗f ) such
that k−γ
4t
(ka∗ + t) = k
4t
[−(2γ + k)a∗ + 3t] . This equality is satisfied if and only if
γ = −2k, which is not in the interval of feasible γ.
From 1.-3., it follows that a∗f > a
∗
p for γ ∈ (0, k].
Moreover, we can rule out the case γ > k. To show this claim, we provide a proof
by contradiction. We know that c′(a∗p) =
k−γ
4t
(γa∗f + (k − γ)a∗p + t) ≥ 0. Now, suppose
that γ > k. Hence, it must be the case that t + γa∗f ≤ (γ − k)a∗p. However, a positive
subscription fee s∗p > 0 implies t+γa
∗
f > (γ+k)a
∗
p. That is, t+γa
∗
f ∈ ((γ+k)a∗p, (γ−k)a∗p],
which cannot be satisfied in equilibrium. Therefore, our assumption was wrong and it
must hold γ ≤ k.
To prove the comparative statics result in part (ii), we rearrange (15) and (14) and
define Fp(γ, a
∗
p) =
k−γ
4t
(γa∗f + (k− γ)a∗p + t)− c′(a∗p) = 0 and Ff (γ, a∗f ) = k4t(−3γa∗f − (k−
γ)a∗p + 3t)− c′(a∗f ) = 0. With the implicit function theorem, we derive
∂a∗f
∂γ
= − ∂Ff/∂γ
∂Ff/∂af
= − (3a
∗
f − a∗p)k
3kγ + 4tc′′(a∗f )
< 0.
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Hence, the advertising level on the free TV channel is always decreasing in γ. Regarding
the advertising level on pay TV, we derive
∂a∗p
∂γ
= − ∂Fp/∂γ
∂Fp/∂ap
=
(a∗f − a∗p)(2γ − k) + t+ ka∗p
(k − γ)2 − 4tc′′(a∗p)
.
The second-order conditions require 4tc′′(a∗p) > (k − γ)2, which implies that the de-
nominator is negative. Moreover, it is always the case that a∗f > a
∗
p. As a result, we
derive that for γ < γ̂, the numerator will be negative, and hence,
∂a∗p
∂γ
> 0⇔ γ < γ̂ ≡ k
(
a∗f − 2a∗p
)− t
2
(
a∗f − a∗p
) .
Part (iii). To show that n∗f ≥ n∗p ∀γ ∈ [0, k], we differentiate three cases:
1. Suppose that γ = k. In this case, we derive n∗f − n∗p = 12t(t − ka∗f ) > 0 because
t > ka∗f .
2. Suppose that γ = 0. In this case, we derive n∗f − n∗p = 12t(t − ka∗p) > 0 because
t > ka∗p.
3. Suppose that γ ∈ (0, k). To show that n∗f ≥ n∗p ∀γ ∈ (0, k), we provide a proof by
contradiction. Suppose that n∗f can fall below n
∗
p in the interval γ ∈ (0, k). Note
that n∗f (γ) and n
∗
p(γ) are both continuous functions in γ. Hence, it must be the
case that n∗f and n
∗
p intersect twice in the interval γ ∈ (0, k) because n∗f (0) > n∗p(0)
and n∗f (k) > n
∗
p(k). However, only one point of intersection exists because
n∗f = n
∗
p =
1
2
⇔ γ = t− ka
∗
p
a∗f − a∗p
.
It follows that the assumption was wrong and n∗f ≥ n∗p ∀γ ∈ (0, k).
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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